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Insight · 4 Jul 2025

Digital Post: What to Check Before Accepting Migrated Access Rights

Datatilsynet seriously criticised the Agency for Digital Government over Digital Post's 2022 supplier switch. Expired reading rights were activated because the agency assumed what a marker in the old supplier's data meant instead of checking.

Data protectionGDPRIdentity and access managementThird-party riskdk

On 21 March 2022 Denmark’s Digital Post changed supplier, from e-Boks A/S to Netcompany A/S, and the Agency for Digital Government (Digitaliseringsstyrelsen) launched Next Generation Digital Post (NgDP). Data moved from the old system to the new one over a weekend. Within days, people could read mailboxes they no longer had any right to. In a combined decision dated 24 June 2025, the Danish Data Protection Agency (Datatilsynet) issued serious criticism, without a fine, under Article 32(1) of the General Data Protection RegulationAn EU regulation governing the processing of personal data and the free movement of that data. It establishes data protection principles, rights for individuals and obligations for controllers and processors. (GDPR). If you own security for a public service that is about to change supplier, the decision reads as a list of what to check.

What Went Wrong

The decision covers four breaches the agency reported and one case Datatilsynet opened on its own initiative:

  • Expired reading rights reactivated. Reading rights to 143 citizen and 313 business mailboxes were not removed even though they had expired. Users opened messages without authorisation in 118 citizen and 341 business mailboxes. The cause: during the migration, a marker in the outgoing supplier’s data was assumed to mean “active reading right”, which it did not. The migration design assumed only active rights would be handed over, so nobody designed or tested for inactive ones. The agency said testing could not have caught it, because the tests would have rested on the same misunderstanding between the parties. Datatilsynet instead stressed that the agency should first have clarified what the migrated data contained. The error was finally fixed for all affected users on 9 May 2022.
  • Revoking one right removed another. A coding error in the tool citizen service staff used to revoke reading rights always removed the top right in the list when the holder had several, not the one selected. Twelve rights that should have been revoked stayed active, with unauthorised logins to ten mailboxes, and 23 legitimate rights were deleted. Regression tests covered only normal granting and revoking, not a holder with several active rights. It took about a year to find.
  • Users with many rights locked out. People with reading rights to many mailboxes, some with between 400 and 700, among them guardians and lawyers managing mailboxes for others, got a blank or endlessly loading page. 7,166 users were affected until 3 May 2022, 2,642 of whom had not tried to log in. The agency had not known that users held so many rights, so the case was not tested and the load testing did not cover it.
  • Citizens enrolled by mistake. The outgoing supplier’s enrolment lists were incomplete, and a later load from the Central Person Register (CPR) enrolled 42,834 citizens who should not have been. Some living abroad missed pension payments because their annual proof-of-life forms went to a digital mailbox they did not know they had. No control comparison with the CPR data was made.
  • A release changed enrolment status. A release on 23 August 2023, which changed how the NemSMS service was handled, removed the enrolment of 116,674 citizens and 1,778 businesses when they updated or confirmed their contact details, and enrolled 20,963 Greenland residents who had not opted in. Of those, 393 had received post from public senders.

Datatilsynet stressed that Digital Post is the main national channel between authorities, citizens and businesses, that messages sent there can have legal effect and that people often cannot opt out. It said that, in general, controllersThe person, public authority, agency or other body that, alone or jointly with others, decides the purposes and means of processing personal data. The controller carries primary responsibility for GDPR compliance and must be able to demonstrate it. offering public systems to many users face higher security expectations, especially where users cannot choose not to use them. It also noted that people who grant reading rights may be particularly vulnerable: people under guardianship, children, patients or the elderly. Datatilsynet announced the decision on 8 July 2025.

What Datatilsynet Expects

For each finding, the decision says what appropriate security under Article 32(1) normally requires:

  • Before a migration between large systems, great care in mapping the different types of rights, and enough clarity about what the migrated data contains to identify the likely failure scenarios and design proper tests. The basis for the migration design, including what the data contains, should be written down, for example in a task and solution description, so the parties can find and resolve ambiguities before the migration.
  • Investigate, do not assume. The agency should have found out what the outgoing supplier’s marker meant instead of relying on an assumption, and should have accounted for the risk of misunderstanding between suppliers.
  • Check completeness. The agency should have checked whether the outgoing supplier’s data covered all citizens with the relevant status.
  • Test every normal use case, including ones that affect only a small share of users or functions used rarely, such as a user holding many rights. Load-test users with many rights. Tell the suppliers of connected clients about such cases so they can test them too.
  • Test what a change might affect indirectly. Before a release, identify the processing it touches, including parts of the system that are not the direct subject of the change.

Separate the Meaning Check From the Transfer Check

An acceptance pack should answer two different questions. Did the records arrive completely and accurately? Reconcile the export with the authoritative source, and compare independent sources where they overlap. And does the new system interpret each record correctly? Only someone who understands the old permission, and what ends it, can answer the second.

For each permission status in the old data, get three statements: the outgoing supplier’s definition, the service owner’s intended entitlement and the incoming supplier’s implemented logic. Record them with a worked example. If they disagree, keep that status out of the migration until it is resolved.

Test From a Different Starting Point

In our view, a test written from the transformation specification will confirm the specification’s own mistake, which is what the agency said happened here. We suggest adding a second reference: a small set of permissions whose correct outcome the service owner establishes from the underlying authorisation history.

For example, set up a synthetic representative with two active delegations and one expired delegation. After import, we suggest checking each one through the service itself, not the admin screen. Then revoke one active delegation and confirm that only that mailbox becomes inaccessible. Add a user with hundreds of delegations to the load test. Use synthetic data where you can; where you need production records, agree who handles them and when the copies are deleted.

Set the Cutover Boundary in Advance

Decide before cutover which defects block release. An unexplained increase in someone’s access may expose personal dataAny information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person, the data subject. A person is identifiable if they can be identified directly or indirectly, for example by a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or factors specific to their identity. and should go to the named risk owner at once; a display defect may follow a different route. Decide what rollback restores: restoring yesterday’s data may bring back a delegation revoked during cutover. After go-live, compare the approved permission baseline with actual entitlements, and give every difference an owner. A supplier’s “migration complete” should start your acceptance decision, not close it.

A Cutover Checklist to Forward

  • Meaning: have both suppliers and the service owner agreed the meaning of every imported status?
  • Completeness: has the outgoing supplier’s data been reconciled with the authoritative source?
  • Independent reference: can a reviewer trace sample entitlements without using the transformation specification?
  • Negative access: do expired, revoked and wrongly linked delegations fail the access test?
  • Scale: can users with many delegations still log in and work?
  • Indirect effects: has each release been tested for effects outside the feature it changes?
  • Decision and recovery: who can stop cutover, and does rollback keep changes made during the transition?
  • Evidence: are the mapping, tests, exceptions and decision stored together?

Start with one high-consequence permission type and the next supplier change. If you want an independent check of your migration controls against Article 32, see our GDPR Compliance Audit.

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