Insight · 15 Aug 2025
Hong Kong Crypto Custody: Approve the Whole Withdrawal Path
The SFC's custody circular of 15 August 2025 took immediate effect for licensed virtual asset trading platforms and their associated entities. Test each withdrawal from instruction to broadcast, not just the key device.
Crypto-assetsCybersecurityThird-party riskhkCrypto-Asset Firms
On 15 August 2025 Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures CommissionHong Kong's independent statutory regulator for securities and futures markets. It sets and enforces market requirements, supervises licensed market participants and investigates misconduct to protect investors and market integrity. Statutory means that its powers come from legislation. A reference to an SFC circular identifies guidance or requirements issued by this regulator, rather than a separate institution. (SFC) issued a circular on the custody of virtual assets to licensed virtual asset trading platform operators and their associated entities. It sets minimum requirements that platforms must meet, gives examples of good practice that are not compulsory and took effect immediately. Its starting point is a set of overseas incidents, reported in the media according to the SFC, where attackers altered a third-party wallet interface, reached approval devices and got signers to approve forged transactions. The SFC says these weaknesses exist regardless of the custody solution used, such as HSMs, MPC or multi-signature wallets. In our view, a certified hardware security module is not enough evidence on its own. You need to show that a withdrawal stays intact from the client’s instruction to the broadcast on the blockchain.
The tests below are our suggested way to gather evidence. They are not additional SFC requirements.
What the Circular Covers
The circular has six parts. Sections II and III are written for cold wallet infrastructure and operation, so the destination address, whitelist and integrity requirements there are framed around cold wallets; the SFC says the incidents point to weaknesses in both hot and cold wallet infrastructure, and Sections IV to VI are not limited to cold wallets.
- I. Senior management. A platform should designate at least one Responsible Officer or Manager-in-Charge to oversee Sections II to VI. Name that person before you start.
- II. Cold wallet infrastructure. Seeds and private keys generated offline where practicable and stored in a secure environment such as a hardware security module (HSM) with appropriate certification. Due diligence on the HSM provider before onboarding and periodically after, including its patch management and prompt re-validation of patched devices. Cold wallet implementations should not include smart contracts on public blockchains.
- III. Cold wallet operation. Air-gapped generation and safeguarding of keys; destination addresses that cannot be changed before a transaction is signed and broadcast; several layers of independent data integrity checks with end-to-end integrity protection from creation to broadcast; whitelists for destination addresses, with strict control over changes to them; dedicated approval devices with restricted functions and limited connectivity, isolated from general-purpose workstations; and full transaction details in human-readable form for any manual check before signing.
- IV. Wallet solutions and third parties. Testing before deployment, segregation of duties over wallet code whether built in-house or bought (the circular says this must be strictly enforced), tight control of administrator access to production, independent code reviews before onboarding a provider or making material changes, ongoing review of providers, periodic independent cybersecurity assessments of the deployed system and regular end-to-end continuity rehearsals with providers.
- V. Real-time monitoring. A security operations centre (SOCSecurity Operations Centre) or equivalent, real-time reconciliation of on-chain client assets with the ledger, detection of unauthorised access to wallet infrastructure, monitoring of dependencies (vendors, technologies, blockchain protocols, encryption algorithms and common libraries), 24/7 monitoring including holidays, with procedures to bring in extra people out of hours, and written policies and procedures for escalating a suspected or actual cybersecurity incident.
- VI. Training. Signers trained to understand verification and what to do when a transaction looks wrong, and measures to prevent blind signing.
The SFC also says that, going forward, these standards will be core expectations for providers of virtual asset custodian services. At the circular’s date that was a statement of direction. On 24 December 2025 the government and the SFC published the conclusions of their consultation on licensing virtual asset custodian service providers. The Virtual Asset Services Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2026, which covers custody services, was published in the Gazette on 20 November 2026; the government says it will be introduced into the Legislative Council on 2 December 2026.
When It Applies
The requirements took immediate effect. The SFC asks platforms to assess their custody framework, procedures and controls against the circular, and says adherence should form part of the annual external compliance and technology assessment. The annual assessment is where the evidence ends up, not a reason to wait for the assessor before fixing a known gap.
Decide Who Owns the Answer
Before collecting evidence, name the people who will decide: the CISOChief Information Security Officer, the wallet operations owner and the Responsible Officer or Manager-in-Charge designated, or to be designated, under Section I. The CISO sets out what is still uncertain; the operational and senior owners decide what happens to the service.
Then fix the boundary: which wallet, which assets, which software version, which transaction path and which suppliers. A platform may approve different assets in different ways. A review of one path does not cover every path that uses the same wallet product name.
Trace One Withdrawal Beyond the Approval Screen
Take a normal client withdrawal and follow the instruction, the destination address and the transaction parameters through every stage. At each one, ask:
- Where is the authoritative record, and which component checks its integrity?
- What stops a change made after the operator reviewed the instruction from reaching the blockchain?
- What does the signer see, and is it the transaction that will actually be signed?
The circular’s own good-practice examples show what a strong answer looks like: a signing terminal in the vault that shows the full transaction and halts if it does not match the intended one, a whitelist check on the destination address at the terminal and a final check before broadcast that compares the signed transaction with the original unsigned one and blocks it if they differ.
Then test a deliberately inconsistent transaction in an agreed test environment with authorised test assets. Does the process stop? Does the alert reach the right person? Does the operator know the exception procedure? Record expected and actual outcomes, and keep private keys, seeds and other sensitive material out of the evidence.
Check the Controls, Not the Feature List
A supplier’s feature list is not evidence that a control works on your platform:
- Approval devices: architecture and configuration evidence of which functions and connections are possible.
- Whitelist changes: the authorisation and audit trail for a real change, and the result of an attempt to send to an address that is not on the list.
- Wallet software: the version actually deployed and the independent code review that covers that version.
- Supplier changes: who would notice a supplier update that changes the reviewed withdrawal path. Section IV expects a fresh assessment before material changes.
Test the Night Shift
Section V expects real-time reconciliation and round-the-clock monitoring, including holidays, with a way to mobilise extra people outside business hours. The real question is whether a discrepancy at 2 a.m. leads to action.
Run an exercise with the actual escalation roster: a simulated unexpected transaction or reconciliation break. Measure how long it takes to reach wallet operations and someone with authority to restrict activity, and check what each person can actually do with their access. If the monitoring works but nobody reachable can stop withdrawals, that is an operating gap, separate from the technology. If the response depends on the wallet vendor, include the vendor; Section IV expects regular end-to-end continuity rehearsals with providers. Use one to test the security response too.
A Wallet Acceptance Card
- Boundary: the wallet, assets, software version and withdrawal path reviewed.
- Integrity: how the authorised instruction stays the same through signing and broadcast.
- Isolation: the key and approval device set-up, including permitted connections.
- Addresses: a traced whitelist change and a blocked attempt to an unapproved address.
- Supplier: the deployed version linked to due diligence, code review and change records.
- Monitoring: reconciliation, out-of-hours escalation and an authorised response.
- Decision: approved within the evidenced boundary, restricted until named fixes are made or withheld for lack of evidence, with what would reopen it.
Start with one withdrawal path and give the completed card to the Responsible Officer or Manager-in-Charge. If you want the path tested independently, see our Security Architecture Review and Source Code Review. A targeted review like this is not the platform’s annual external compliance and technology assessment unless the engagement says so.
